Introduction
"... had had longer experience as a responsible leader in great battles than any other man of our time."
-General Dwight Eisehnower
The Soviet Union's victory in the Second World War ranks among the great achievements in military history. After twenty years of crisis, reform, and enormous expansion, the Red Army was essentially decapitated during the purges of 1937 to 1939. A year later, the world was surprised to see the Soviets have great difficulty defeating tiny Finland. It is little wonder that few in the west gave the Red Army a chance against the German Army, or Wehrmacht When the German invasion did come in June of 1941, the Soviets were decimated. Within five months, the Germans had effectively surrounded Leningrad, were on the outskirts of Moscow and over five million Soviet soldiers were dead or prisoners of war. Yet, the Red Army rebounded from these calamities. Sometimes clumsily, and never cheaply, it fought off the Germans and drove them all the way back to Berlin. 
The Rise of Zhukov and the Red Army
"Outspoken man of action whose qualities are more those of die will than of the intellect. He is highly regarded in Soviet military circles and is considered to be an especially capable officer and good organizer. He was the first to stand up for the massed use of tanks and successfully carried it off in practice."^ -captured German document on Zhukov
Because Zhukov was a uniquely Soviet commander, it is necessary to examine the environment in which he developed professionally. In a sense, Gol.
• Khalkin Gol: The Soviet Prototype Stalin's, was notoriously weak and incompetent. So, in effect, Zhukov reported to Stalin.
After surveying the terrain and troop emplacements, Zhukov concluded that additional forces would be required to hold against further Japanese attack. During
July, the Japanese launched two attacks to drive the Soviets back to the western bank of the river. However, both assaults failed. After the first Japanese attack, Zhukov presented a plan to Moscow for an attack that would drive the Japanese from Mongolian territory. Once Stalin approved the plan, Zhukov assumed command and accelerated the build-up of forces.
Even though the Japanese had increased their forces to more than 40,000 men, the Soviets still managed to achieve numerical superiority by early August.
Zhukov's expanded force included 60,000 Soviet and Mongolian troops and was spearheaded by over 500 tanks. In 1939, Khalkin Gol was more than 600 kilometers from the nearest railway. Accordingly, the entire Soviet build up had to occur via It is difficult to accurately gauge casualties during the operation. The Soviets acknowledged nearly 18,000 killed and wounded. The Japanese conceded 30,000 killed and wounded. However, the Soviets placed Japanese casualties at 52,000. In any case the outcome was clear and Tokyo had learned its lesson. On 15 September, two weeks after German and Red Army forces invaded Poland, Japan, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union signed a cease fire.
The Prototype
Khalkin Beginning at Khalkin Gol, intensive logistic preparation became a Zhukov hallmark. The Japanese underestimated the Soviets in many ways. In particular, they never imagined the Soviets would be able to sustain a large combined arms force on the Mongolian frontier, nearly 600 kilometers from the nearest railway.
Yet, during the artillery duals leading up to the offensive, it was the Soviet gunners who were able to fire several rounds to each fired by the enemy. This was true despite the fact that the Soviet supply lines were much longer than those of the Japanese. This would again set the pattern for later operations against the Germans.
Time and again, Zhukov ensured that operational plans included the logistic underpinnings necessary for success. This often extended beyond food and ammunition. One example is evident at Kursk, where the Germans lost hundreds of tanks due to damage or mechanical breakdown. German tank recovery and repair units, operating from the rear, were simply unable to get to the front. The
Soviet tank repair battalions, on the other hand, operated with the armored units themselves. Though they were exposed to higher losses, the Soviet tank repair units were able to quickly return hundreds of broken down or damaged tanks to combat.
Zhukov's distinctive use of deception in order to achieve surprise is also evident at Khalkin Gol. Troop movements were carried out at night. Tanks with their mufflers removed were constantly driven along the front to desensitize the Japanese to the sound. In order to convince the Japanese that the Soviets intended to remain on the defensive, loudspeakers were used to broadcast the sound of pile- 
Zhukov Reassessed
"In the constellation of Soviet generals who so conclusively defeated the armies of Nazi Germany, he [Zhukov] Montgomery. There has remained a lingering perception in the west that the Soviets succeeded more due to their seemingly endless pool of manpower, the sheer ruthlessness of the leadership, and crucial German mistakes, than through any operational or tactical skill of their own. The two quotes cited above illustrate the conflicting views of Zhukov. In particular, Zhukov's critics have tended to focus on three issues: 1) that he did not do enough to convince Stalin of the need to prepare for the German Invasion; 2) that he succeeded through overwhelming numbers, and 3) that he was indifferent to high casualties. With regard to numbers, the experience at Khalkin Gol is illustrative.
Though the Soviets achieved superiority at the main points of attack, the overall Soviet superiority was hardly overwhelming, on the order of 1. However, the Red Army ultimately won a crushing victory over Germany.
American policy makers and commanders should be vigilant to avoid the mistake of the Germans. Our next opponent will probably lack our technology and training.
That does not mean that he will not have ways of attacking our vulnerabilities.
The second lesson learned is that those nations employing former Soviet doctrine are likely to employ large operational reserves. If properly led and employed, these formations could be very dangerous against U.S. and coalition forces. They will be attractive targets for U.S. operational fires. At the same time,
American commanders must be on guard for their own forces' culmination and the risk of enemy counter attack. The next Zhukov could be waiting out there.
• 22
